Richard Tafoya
Sep 8th, 2008, 12:51 AM
When John McCain touts his visionary belief in the surge, was it really just another rubber stamp for Bush? Another 90% decision?
If he'd consulted with military leaders at the Pentagon and backed their assessment, he would have reached the same conclusion as Obama.
And, as we're learning now, if the Sunni Awakening and a very effective wave of espionage had not coincided with our troop deployments, the results of the surge would have been very different.
Washington Post:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07/AR2008090702426_pf.html
At the Joint Chiefs of Staff (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Joint+Chiefs+of+Staff?tid=informline) in late November 2006, Gen. Peter Pace (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Peter+Pace?tid=informline) was facing every chairman's nightmare: a potential revolt of the other chiefs. Two months earlier, the JCS had convened a special team of colonels to recommend options for reversing the deteriorating situation in Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=el). Now, it appeared that the chiefs' and colonels' advice was being marginalized, if not ignored, by the White House (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+White+House?tid=informline).
During a JCS meeting with the colonels Nov. 20, Chairman Pace dropped a bomb: The White House was considering a "surge" of additional troops to quell the violence in Iraq. "Would it be a good idea?" Pace asked the group. "If so, what would you do with five more brigades?" That amounted to 20,000 to 30,000 more troops, depending on the number of support personnel.
Pace's question caught the chiefs and colonels off guard. The JCS hadn't recommended a surge, and Gen. George W. Casey Jr. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+Casey?tid=informline), the Iraq commander, was opposed to one of that magnitude. Where had this come from? Was it a serious option? Was it already a done deal?
...
A rift had been growing between the country's military and civilian leadership, and in several JCS meetings that November, the chiefs' frustrations burst into the open. They had all but dismissed the surge option, worried that the armed forces were already stretched to the breaking point. They favored a renewed effort to train and build up the Iraqi security forces so that U.S. troops could begin to leave.
...
The president announced the surge decision Jan. 10, 2007. Five more brigades would go to Baghdad; 4,000 Marines would head to Anbar province.
The next morning, he went to Fort Benning (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Fort+Benning?tid=informline), Ga., to address military personnel and their families. His decision had been opposed by Casey and Abizaid, his military commanders in Iraq. Pace and the Joint Chiefs, his top military advisers, had suggested a smaller increase, if any at all. Schoomaker, the Army chief, had made it clear that the five brigades didn't really exist under the Army's current policy of 12-month rotations. But on this morning, the president delivered his own version of history.
"The commanders on the ground in Iraq, people who I listen to -- by the way, that's what you want your commander-in-chief to do. You don't want decisions being made based upon politics or focus groups or political polls. You want your military decisions being made by military experts. They analyzed the plan, and they said to me and to the Iraqi government: 'This won't work unless we help them. There needs to be a bigger presence.' "
If he'd consulted with military leaders at the Pentagon and backed their assessment, he would have reached the same conclusion as Obama.
And, as we're learning now, if the Sunni Awakening and a very effective wave of espionage had not coincided with our troop deployments, the results of the surge would have been very different.
Washington Post:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07/AR2008090702426_pf.html
At the Joint Chiefs of Staff (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Joint+Chiefs+of+Staff?tid=informline) in late November 2006, Gen. Peter Pace (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Peter+Pace?tid=informline) was facing every chairman's nightmare: a potential revolt of the other chiefs. Two months earlier, the JCS had convened a special team of colonels to recommend options for reversing the deteriorating situation in Iraq (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=el). Now, it appeared that the chiefs' and colonels' advice was being marginalized, if not ignored, by the White House (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+White+House?tid=informline).
During a JCS meeting with the colonels Nov. 20, Chairman Pace dropped a bomb: The White House was considering a "surge" of additional troops to quell the violence in Iraq. "Would it be a good idea?" Pace asked the group. "If so, what would you do with five more brigades?" That amounted to 20,000 to 30,000 more troops, depending on the number of support personnel.
Pace's question caught the chiefs and colonels off guard. The JCS hadn't recommended a surge, and Gen. George W. Casey Jr. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+Casey?tid=informline), the Iraq commander, was opposed to one of that magnitude. Where had this come from? Was it a serious option? Was it already a done deal?
...
A rift had been growing between the country's military and civilian leadership, and in several JCS meetings that November, the chiefs' frustrations burst into the open. They had all but dismissed the surge option, worried that the armed forces were already stretched to the breaking point. They favored a renewed effort to train and build up the Iraqi security forces so that U.S. troops could begin to leave.
...
The president announced the surge decision Jan. 10, 2007. Five more brigades would go to Baghdad; 4,000 Marines would head to Anbar province.
The next morning, he went to Fort Benning (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Fort+Benning?tid=informline), Ga., to address military personnel and their families. His decision had been opposed by Casey and Abizaid, his military commanders in Iraq. Pace and the Joint Chiefs, his top military advisers, had suggested a smaller increase, if any at all. Schoomaker, the Army chief, had made it clear that the five brigades didn't really exist under the Army's current policy of 12-month rotations. But on this morning, the president delivered his own version of history.
"The commanders on the ground in Iraq, people who I listen to -- by the way, that's what you want your commander-in-chief to do. You don't want decisions being made based upon politics or focus groups or political polls. You want your military decisions being made by military experts. They analyzed the plan, and they said to me and to the Iraqi government: 'This won't work unless we help them. There needs to be a bigger presence.' "